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Abstract

In this paper we discuss AN.ON’s need to provide perfect forward secrecy and show by an estimation of the channel build up time that the straight forward solution is not a practical solution. In the remaining paper we propose an improvement which enables AN.ON to provide perfect forward secrecy with respect to their current attacker model. Finally, we show that the delay, caused by our improvement, does not decrease the performance significantly.

Keywords

Hash Table Additional Delay Exit Node Perfect Forward Secrecy Anonymity Network 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Benedikt Westermann
    • 1
  • Dogan Kesdogan
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Q2S, NTNUTrondheimNorway
  2. 2.Chair for IT Security, FB5University of SiegenSiegenGermany

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