Lagrangian E-Voting: Verifiability on Demand and Strong Privacy

  • Łukasz Krzywiecki
  • Mirosław Kutyłowski
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6101)

Abstract

We propose a new approach to verifiability of Internet e-voting procedures: correct counting of each single ballot can be checked, but verification is a zero-knowledge court procedure. After verification period is over, certain keys are destroyed and breaking vote privacy becomes substantially harder.

Our main goal is to provide a framework for the political situation in which the voters are more concerned about disclosure of their preferences than about the correctness of the results. Our approach also responds to threats of coercion exercised by a physically present coercer.

Our approach can be used on top of most previous schemes to improve their privacy features. It is limited to the cases when the voters hold electronic ID cards.

Keywords

remote e-voting electronic ID card anonymity verifiability Lagrangian interpolation zero-knowledge proof undeniable signature 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Łukasz Krzywiecki
    • 1
  • Mirosław Kutyłowski
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute of Mathematics and Computer ScienceWrocław University of TechnologyWrocławPoland

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