Anonymous Authentication with TLS and DAA

  • Emanuele Cesena
  • Hans Löhr
  • Gianluca Ramunno
  • Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
  • Davide Vernizzi
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6101)


Anonymous credential systems provide privacy-preserving authentication solutions for accessing services and resources. In these systems, copying and sharing credentials can be a serious issue. As this cannot be prevented in software alone, these problems form a major obstacle for the use of fully anonymous authentication systems in practice. In this paper, we propose a solution for anonymous authentication that is based on a hardware security module to prevent sharing of credentials. Our protocols are based on the standard protocols Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA). We present a detailed description and a reference implementation of our approach based on a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) as hardware security module. Moreover, we discuss drawbacks and alternatives, and provide a pure software implementation to compare with our TPM-based approach.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Emanuele Cesena
    • 1
  • Hans Löhr
    • 2
  • Gianluca Ramunno
    • 1
  • Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
    • 2
  • Davide Vernizzi
    • 1
  1. 1.Dip. di Automatica e InformaticaPolitecnico di TorinoItaly
  2. 2.Horst Görtz Institute for IT SecurityRuhr-University BochumGermany

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