Domain Extension for Enhanced Target Collision-Resistant Hash Functions

  • Ilya Mironov
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6147)

Abstract

We answer the question of Reyhanitabar et al. from FSE’09 of constructing a domain extension scheme for enhanced target collision-resistant (eTCR) hash functions with sublinear key expansion. The eTCR property, introduced by Halevi and Krawczyk [1], is a natural fit for hash-and-sign signature schemes, offering an attractive alternative to collision-resistant hash functions. We prove a new composition theorem for eTCR, and demonstrate that eTCR compression functions exist if and only if one-way functions do.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ilya Mironov
    • 1
  1. 1.Microsoft ResearchSilicon Valley Campus 

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