Efficient Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution

  • Esther Hänggi
  • Renato Renner
  • Stefan Wolf
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6110)


An efficient protocol for quantum key distribution is proposed the security of which is entirely device-independent and not even based on the accuracy of quantum physics. A scheme of that type relies on the quantum-physical phenomenon of non-local correlations and on the assumption that no illegitimate information flows within and between Alice’s and Bob’s laboratories. The latter can be enforced via the non-signaling postulate of relativity if all measurements are carried out simultaneously enough.


Quantum Cryptography Entangle Quantum State Collective Attack Information Reconciliation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Esther Hänggi
    • 1
  • Renato Renner
    • 2
  • Stefan Wolf
    • 1
  1. 1.Computer Science DepartmentETH ZurichZürichSwitzerland
  2. 2.Institute for Theoretical PhysicsETH ZurichZürichSwitzerland

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