Scratch, Click & Vote: E2E Voting over the Internet

  • Mirosław Kutyłowski
  • Filip Zagórski
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6000)

Abstract

We present Scratch, Click & Vote remote voting scheme. The scheme is end-to-end verifiable and allows for voting over the Internet. It guarantees security against malicious hardware and software used by a voter; a voter’s computer does not get any knowledge about the voter’s choice. Moreover, it can blindly change the voter’s ballot with a small probability only.

Keywords

Internet voting e-voting E2E verifiable voting scheme ThreeBallot Punchscan 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mirosław Kutyłowski
    • 1
  • Filip Zagórski
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute of Mathematics and Computer ScienceWrocław University of Technology 

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