A Practical and Secure Coercion-Resistant Scheme for Internet Voting

(Extended Abstract)
  • Roberto Araújo
  • Sébastien Foulle
  • Jacques Traoré
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6000)

Abstract

Juels, Catalano, and Jakobsson (JCJ) proposed at WPES 2005 the first voting scheme that considers real-world threats and that is more realistic for Internet elections. Their scheme, though, has a quadratic work factor and thereby is not efficient for large scale elections. Based on the work of JCJ, Smith proposed an efficient scheme that has a linear work factor. In this paper we first show that Smith’s scheme is insecure. Then we present a new coercion-resistant election scheme with a linear work factor that overcomes the flaw of Smith’s proposal. Our solution is based on the group signature scheme of Camenisch and Lysyanskaya (Crypto 2004).

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Roberto Araújo
    • 1
  • Sébastien Foulle
    • 2
  • Jacques Traoré
    • 2
  1. 1.TU-DarmstadtDarmstadtGermany
  2. 2.Orange LabsCaen CedexFrance

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