On Some Incompatible Properties of Voting Schemes

  • Benoît Chevallier-Mames
  • Pierre-Alain Fouque
  • David Pointcheval
  • Julien Stern
  • Jacques Traoré
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6000)


In this paper, we study the problem of simultaneously achieving several security properties, for voting schemes, without non-standard assumptions. More specifically, we focus on the universal verifiability of the computation of the tally, on the unconditional privacy/anonymity of the votes, and on the receipt-freeness properties, for the most classical election processes. Under usual assumptions and efficiency requirements, we show that a voting system that wants to publish the final list of the voters who actually voted, and to compute the number of times each candidate has been chosen, we cannot achieve:

  • universal verifiability of the tally (UV) and unconditional privacy of the votes (UP) simultaneously, unless all the registered voters actually vote;

  • universal verifiability of the tally (UV) and receipt- freeness (RF), unless private channels are available between the voters and/or the voting authorities.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Benoît Chevallier-Mames
    • 1
  • Pierre-Alain Fouque
    • 2
  • David Pointcheval
    • 2
  • Julien Stern
    • 3
  • Jacques Traoré
    • 4
  1. 1.DCSSI 
  2. 2.ENS – CNRS – INRIA 
  3. 3.Cryptolog International 
  4. 4.Orange Labs – France Telecom R&D 

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