Towards Trustworthy Elections pp 191-199

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6000)

On Some Incompatible Properties of Voting Schemes

  • Benoît Chevallier-Mames
  • Pierre-Alain Fouque
  • David Pointcheval
  • Julien Stern
  • Jacques Traoré

Abstract

In this paper, we study the problem of simultaneously achieving several security properties, for voting schemes, without non-standard assumptions. More specifically, we focus on the universal verifiability of the computation of the tally, on the unconditional privacy/anonymity of the votes, and on the receipt-freeness properties, for the most classical election processes. Under usual assumptions and efficiency requirements, we show that a voting system that wants to publish the final list of the voters who actually voted, and to compute the number of times each candidate has been chosen, we cannot achieve:

  • universal verifiability of the tally (UV) and unconditional privacy of the votes (UP) simultaneously, unless all the registered voters actually vote;

  • universal verifiability of the tally (UV) and receipt- freeness (RF), unless private channels are available between the voters and/or the voting authorities.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Benoît Chevallier-Mames
    • 1
  • Pierre-Alain Fouque
    • 2
  • David Pointcheval
    • 2
  • Julien Stern
    • 3
  • Jacques Traoré
    • 4
  1. 1.DCSSI 
  2. 2.ENS – CNRS – INRIA 
  3. 3.Cryptolog International 
  4. 4.Orange Labs – France Telecom R&D 

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