Practical Power Analysis Attacks on Software Implementations of McEliece

  • Stefan Heyse
  • Amir Moradi
  • Christof Paar
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-12929-2_9

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6061)
Cite this paper as:
Heyse S., Moradi A., Paar C. (2010) Practical Power Analysis Attacks on Software Implementations of McEliece. In: Sendrier N. (eds) Post-Quantum Cryptography. PQCrypto 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6061. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

The McEliece public-key cryptosystem is based on the fact that decoding unknown linear binary codes is an NP-complete problem. The interest on implementing post-quantum cryptographic algorithms, e.g. McEliece, on microprocessor-based platforms has been extremely raised due to the increasing storage space of these platforms. Therefore, their vulnerability and robustness against physical attacks, e.g., state-of-the-art power analysis attacks, must be investigated. In this work, we address mainly two power analysis attacks on various implementations of McEliece on an 8-bit AVR microprocessor. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that such side-channel attacks are practically evaluated.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Stefan Heyse
    • 1
  • Amir Moradi
    • 1
  • Christof Paar
    • 1
  1. 1.Horst Görtz Institute for IT SecurityRuhr University BochumGermany

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