Strongly Unforgeable Signatures and Hierarchical Identity-Based Signatures from Lattices without Random Oracles

  • Markus Rückert
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-12929-2_14

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6061)
Cite this paper as:
Rückert M. (2010) Strongly Unforgeable Signatures and Hierarchical Identity-Based Signatures from Lattices without Random Oracles. In: Sendrier N. (eds) Post-Quantum Cryptography. PQCrypto 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6061. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

We propose a variant of the “bonsai tree” signature scheme, a lattice-based existentially unforgeable signature scheme in the standard model. Our construction offers the same efficiency as the “bonsai tree” scheme but supports the stronger notion of strong unforgeability. Strong unforgeability demands that the adversary is unable to produce a new message-signature pair (m, s), even if he or she is allowed to see a different signature s for m.

In particular, we provide the first treeless signature scheme that supports strong unforgeability for the post-quantum era in the standard model. Moreover, we show how to directly implement identity-based, and even hierarchical identity-based, signatures (IBS) in the same strong security model without random oracles. An additional advantage of this direct approach over the usual generic conversion of hierarchical identity-based encryption to IBS is that we can exploit the efficiency of ideal lattices without significantly harming security.

We equip all constructions with strong security proofs based on mild worst-case assumptions on lattices and we also propose concrete security parameters.

Keywords

Post-quantum cryptography lattice cryptography digital signatures identity-based cryptography standard model 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Markus Rückert
    • 1
  1. 1.Cryptography and Computeralgebra, Department of Computer ScienceTU Darmstadt 

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