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Abstract

This paper proposed a new bilateral model supporting cooperative behavior. It is inspired by cooperation in hunting [34,38] and food sharing of female vampire bats [56,57,58]. In this paper, it is postulated, that low bounding of food capacity (fast saturation) in conjunction with a high demand of food energy (fast starving without food) strongly supports cooperative behavior. These postulations are integrated within the proposed model as an extension of the prisoner dilemma [10,11,49].

Keywords

bio-inspired models trust management self-organizing communities cooperative systems cooperative hunting food sharing behavior vampire bats 

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Copyright information

© ICST Institute for Computer Science, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ricardo Buettner
    • 1
  1. 1.FOM Hochschule für Oekonomie & ManagementUniversity of Applied SciencesMuenchenGermany

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