Cryptanalysis of the 10-Round Hash and Full Compression Function of SHAvite-3-512

  • Praveen Gauravaram
  • Gaëtan Leurent
  • Florian Mendel
  • María Naya-Plasencia
  • Thomas Peyrin
  • Christian Rechberger
  • Martin Schläffer
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6055)

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the SHAvite-3-512 hash function, as proposed and tweaked for round 2 of the SHA-3 competition. We present cryptanalytic results on 10 out of 14 rounds of the hash function SHAvite-3-512, and on the full 14 round compression function of SHAvite-3-512. We show a second preimage attack on the hash function reduced to 10 rounds with a complexity of 2497 compression function evaluations and 216 memory. For the full 14-round compression function, we give a chosen counter, chosen salt preimage attack with 2384 compression function evaluations and 2128 memory (or complexity 2448 without memory), and a collision attack with 2192 compression function evaluations and 2128 memory.

Keywords

hash function cryptanalysis collision (second) preimage 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Praveen Gauravaram
    • 1
  • Gaëtan Leurent
    • 2
  • Florian Mendel
    • 3
  • María Naya-Plasencia
    • 4
  • Thomas Peyrin
    • 5
  • Christian Rechberger
    • 6
  • Martin Schläffer
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of MathematicsDTUDenmark
  2. 2.ENSFrance
  3. 3.IAIKTUGrazAustria
  4. 4.FHNW WindischSwitzerland
  5. 5.IngenicoFrance
  6. 6.ESAT/COSICK.U.Leuven and IBBTBelgium

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