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Firewall Mechanism in a User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model

  • Raja Naeem Akram
  • Konstantinos Markantonakis
  • Keith Mayes
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6035)

Abstract

Multi-application smart card technology facilitates applications to securely share their data and functionality. The security enforcement and assurance in application sharing is provided by the smart card firewall. The firewall mechanism is well defined and studied in the Issuer Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (ICOM), in which a smart card is under total control of its issuer. However, it is not analysed in the User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (UCOM) that delegates the smart card control to their users. In this paper, we present UCOM’s security requirements for the firewall mechanism and propose a generic framework that satisfies them.

Keywords

Virtual Machine Smart Card Shareable Resource Server Application Authentication Protocol 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Raja Naeem Akram
    • 1
  • Konstantinos Markantonakis
    • 1
  • Keith Mayes
    • 1
  1. 1.Information Security Group Smart card Centre, Royal HollowayUniversity of London, EghamSurreyUnited Kingdom

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