Simple Power Analysis on Exponentiation Revisited

  • Jean-Christophe Courrège
  • Benoit Feix
  • Mylène Roussellet
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-12510-2_6

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6035)
Cite this paper as:
Courrège JC., Feix B., Roussellet M. (2010) Simple Power Analysis on Exponentiation Revisited. In: Gollmann D., Lanet JL., Iguchi-Cartigny J. (eds) Smart Card Research and Advanced Application. CARDIS 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6035. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

Power Analysis has been studied since 1998 when P. Kocher et al. presented the first attack. From the initial Simple Power Analysis more complex techniques have been designed and studied during the previous decade such as Differential and Correlation Power Analysis. In this paper we revisit Simple Power Analysis which is at the heart of side channel techniques. We aim at showing its true efficiency when studied rigorously. Based on existing Chosen Message attacks we explain in this paper how particular message values can reveal the secret exponent manipulated during a modular exponentiation with a single power consumption curve. We detail the different ways to achieve this and then show that some blinded exponentiations can still be threatened by Simple Power Analysis depending on the implementation. Finally we will give advice on countermeasures to prevent such enhanced Simple Power Analysis techniques.

Keywords

Public key cryptography long integer arithmetic modular exponentiation power analysis 

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jean-Christophe Courrège
    • 1
  • Benoit Feix
    • 2
  • Mylène Roussellet
    • 2
  1. 1.CEACI-THALESToulouseFrance
  2. 2.INSIDE CONTACTLESSAix-en-Provence, Cedex 3France

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