A User Interface for a Game-Based Protocol Verification Tool

  • Peeter Laud
  • Ilja Tšahhirov
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5983)

Abstract

We present a platform that allows a protocol researcher to specify the sequence of games from an initial protocol to a protocol where the security property under consideration can be shown to hold using “conventional” means. Our tool represents the protocol in the form of a program dependency graph. A step in the sequence corresponds to replacing a local fragment in the current graph. The researcher interacts with the tool by pointing out the location of this fragment and choosing the applied transformation from a list. The tool guarantees the error-freeness of the sequence. By our knowledge, this is the first time where the aspects of user interaction have been seriously considered for a sequence-of-games-based protocol analyzer.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Peeter Laud
    • 1
  • Ilja Tšahhirov
    • 2
  1. 1.Cybernetica AS and Tartu University 
  2. 2.Institute of Cybernetics at Tallinn University of Technology 

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