Moral Normativity Is (Naturally) Grown

Abstract

This chapter suggests an approach to a “naturalistic” explication of moral “ought” that, at the same time, avoids reductionism. The central thesis states that “X ought to do something” means nothing but Y wants X to do it, with “X” and “Y” being any individuals or groups of individuals with the only conditions being that (a) they want something from somebody else and (b) they can understand that “want”. Thus, normativity is a part of the real world. This thesis goes beyond mere biological principles by understanding the moral “ought” as a process of translating volitions that can be described as “exteriorization”. By means of scripture, these exteriorized volitions are institutionalized by existing members of a community, thus outlasting the particular individuals. Since they become part of the cultural heritage, they can be re-interiorized by new members of the community. Interiorized norms are a part of the social world, which every new generation will find and will have to internalize (even if it changes them).