Security Flaws in an Efficient Pseudo-Random Number Generator for Low-Power Environments

  • Pedro Peris-Lopez
  • Julio C. Hernandez-Castro
  • Juan M. E. Tapiador
  • Enrique San Millán
  • Jan C. A. van der Lubbe
Part of the Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering book series (LNICST, volume 42)

Abstract

In 2004, Settharam and Rhee tackled the design of a lightweight Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) suitable for low-power environments (e.g. sensor networks, low-cost RFID tags). First, they explicitly fixed a set of requirements for this primitive. Then, they proposed a PRNG conforming to these requirements and using a free-running timer [9]. We analyze this primitive discovering important security faults. The proposed algorithm fails to pass even relatively non-stringent batteries of randomness such as ENT (i.e. a pseudorandom number sequence test program). We prove that their recommended PRNG has a very short period due to the flawed design of its core. The internal state can be easily revealed, compromising its backward and forward security. Additionally, the rekeying algorithm is defectively designed mainly related to the unpractical value proposed for this purpose.

Keywords

Sensor networks RFID PRNG security cryptanalysis 

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Copyright information

© ICST Institute for Computer Science, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Pedro Peris-Lopez
    • 1
  • Julio C. Hernandez-Castro
    • 2
  • Juan M. E. Tapiador
    • 3
  • Enrique San Millán
    • 4
  • Jan C. A. van der Lubbe
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Information and CommunicationDelft University of TechnologyThe Netherlands
  2. 2.School of ComputingBuckingham Building, Lion TerracePortsmouthUnited Kingdom
  3. 3.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of York, HeslingtonYorkUnited Kingdom
  4. 4.Department of Electrical EngineeringUniversity Carlos III of MadridLeganésSpain

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