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Characterization of Strategy-Proof, Revenue Monotone Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms and Connection with False-Name-Proofness

  • Taiki Todo
  • Atsushi Iwasaki
  • Makoto Yokoo
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5929)

Abstract

A combinatorial auction mechanism consists of an allocation rule and a payment rule. There have been several studies on characterizing strategy-proof allocation rules. In particular, conditions called weak-monotonicity has been identified as a full characterization of them. On the other hand, revenue monotonicity is recognized as one of the desirable properties. A combinatorial auction mechanism is revenue monotone if a seller’s revenue is guaranteed to weakly increase as the number of bidders grows. Though the property is quite reasonable, there exists virtually no work on the characterization. In this paper, we identified a simple condition called summation-monotonicity. We then proved that we can construct a strategy-proof, revenue monotone mechanism if and only if the allocation rule satisfies weak-monotonicity and summation-monotonicity. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to characterize revenue monotone allocation rules. In addition, we shed light on a connection between revenue monotonicity and false-name-proofness. In fact, we proved that, assuming a natural condition, revenue monotonicity is equivalent to false-name-proofness for single-item auctions.

Keywords

Allocation Rule Social Choice Function Combinatorial Auction Auction Mechanism Minimum Type 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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    Todo, T., Iwasaki, A., Yokoo, M.: Characterization of strategy-proof, revenue monotone combinatorial auction mechanisms and connection with false-name-proofness (2009), http://agent.is.kyushu-u.ac.jp/~todo/wine2009_full.pdf
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Taiki Todo
    • 1
  • Atsushi Iwasaki
    • 1
  • Makoto Yokoo
    • 1
  1. 1.Graduate School of ISEEKyushu UniversityFukuokaJapan

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