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Ad Exchanges: Research Issues

  • S. Muthukrishnan
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5929)

Abstract

An emerging way to sell and buy display ads on the Internet is via ad exchanges. RightMedia [1], AdECN [2] and DoubleClick Ad Exchange [3] are examples of such real-time two-sided markets. We describe an abstraction of this market. Based on that abstraction, we present several research directions and discuss some insights.

Keywords

Research Issue Reserve Price Spot Market Price Auction Optimal Mechanism 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • S. Muthukrishnan
    • 1
  1. 1.Google Inc. 

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