Related-Key Rectangle Attack of the Full HAS-160 Encryption Mode

  • Orr Dunkelman
  • Ewan Fleischmann
  • Michael Gorski
  • Stefan Lucks
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5922)

Abstract

In this paper we investigate the security of the encryption mode of the HAS-160 hash function. HAS-160 is a Korean hash standard which is widely used in Korean industry. The structure of HAS-160 is similar to SHA-1 besides some modifications. In this paper, we present the first cryptographic attack that breaks the encryption mode of the full 80-round HAS-160. SHACAL-1 and the encryption mode of HAS-160 are both blockciphers with key size 512 bits and plain-/ciphertext size of 160 bits.

We apply a key recovery attack that needs about 2155 chosen plaintexts and 2377.5 80-round HAS-160 encryptions. The attack does not aim for a collision, preimage or 2nd-preimage attack, but it shows that HAS-160 used as a block cipher can be differentiated from an ideal cipher faster than exhaustive search.

Keywords

differential cryptanalysis related-key rectangle attack  HAS-160 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Orr Dunkelman
    • 1
  • Ewan Fleischmann
    • 2
  • Michael Gorski
    • 2
  • Stefan Lucks
    • 2
  1. 1.Ecole Normale SuperieureFrance
  2. 2.Bauhaus-University WeimarGermany

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