An Update Operator for Strategic Ability

  • Paolo Turrini
  • Jan Broersen
  • Rosja Mastop
  • John-Jules Meyer
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5834)


Coalition Logic does not explicitly talk about the effects of a coalitional move on the strategic ability of the remaining players, while in Game Theory reasoning patterns involving this concept often occur. To fill this gap, we study an update operator for strategic ability update in coalition structures. Its formal connections with the update operators known from Dynamic Epistemic Logic will be discussed.


Coalition Structure Public Announcement Strategic Game Coalition Model Dynamic Epistemic Logic 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Paolo Turrini
    • 1
  • Jan Broersen
    • 1
  • Rosja Mastop
    • 2
  • John-Jules Meyer
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Information and Computing SciencesUtrecht Universitythe Netherlands
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyUtrecht Universitythe Netherlands

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