Twelve Angry Men: A Study on the Fine-Grain of Announcements

  • Davide Grossi
  • Fernando R. Velázquez-Quesada
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5834)


By moving from a suggestive example, the paper analyzes how information flows among agents involved in a deliberation. By deliberating, agents become aware of details, draw the attention of the group to some issues, perform inferences and announce what they know. The proposed framework—which builds on the paradigm of dynamic logic—captures how, during a deliberation, information results from step-wise multi-agent interaction.


epistemic logic dynamic epistemic logic awareness inference interaction deliberation 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Davide Grossi
    • 1
  • Fernando R. Velázquez-Quesada
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute for Logic, Language and ComputationUniversiteit van AmsterdamAmsterdamthe Netherlands

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