The Balloon Popping Problem Revisited: Lower and Upper Bounds

  • Hyunwoo Jung
  • Kyung-Yong Chwa
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5814)


We consider the balloon popping problem introduced by Immorlica et al. in 2007 [13]. This problem is directly related to the problem of profit maximization in online auctions, where an auctioneer is selling a collection of identical items to anonymous unit-demand bidders. The auctioneer has the full knowledge of bidders’ private valuations for the items and tries to maximize his profit. Compared with the profit of fixed price schemes, the competitive ratio of Immorlica et al.’s algorithm was in the range [1.64, 4.33]. In this paper, we narrow the gap to [1.659, 2].


auction lower bound upper bound 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hyunwoo Jung
    • 1
  • Kyung-Yong Chwa
    • 1
  1. 1.Division of Computer ScienceKorea Advanced Institute of Science and TechnologyDaejeonRepublic of Korea

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