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The Coremelt Attack

  • Ahren Studer
  • Adrian Perrig
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5789)

Abstract

Current Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks are directed towards a specific victim. The research community has devised several countermeasures that protect the victim host against undesired traffic.

We present Coremelt, a new attack mechanism, where attackers only send traffic between each other, and not towards a victim host. As a result, none of the attack traffic is unwanted. The Coremelt attack is powerful because among N attackers, there are O(N2) connections, which cause significant damage in the core of the network. We demonstrate the attack based on simulations within a real Internet topology using realistic attacker distributions and show that attackers can induce a significant amount of congestion.

Keywords

Autonomous System Backbone Link Target Link USENIX Security Symposium Malicious Party 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ahren Studer
    • 1
  • Adrian Perrig
    • 1
  1. 1.Carnegie Mellon UniversityUSA

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