Model-Checking DoS Amplification for VoIP Session Initiation

  • Ravinder Shankesi
  • Musab AlTurki
  • Ralf Sasse
  • Carl A. Gunter
  • José Meseguer
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5789)

Abstract

Current techniques for the formal modeling analysis of DoS attacks do not adequately deal with amplification attacks that may target a complex distributed system as a whole rather than a specific server. Such threats have emerged for important applications such as the VoIP Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). We demonstrate a model-checking technique for finding amplification threats using a strategy we call measure checking that checks for a quantitative assessment of attacker impact using term rewriting. We illustrate the effectiveness of this technique with a study of SIP. In particular, we show how to automatically find known attacks and verify that proposed patches for these attacks achieve their aim. Beyond this, we demonstrate a new amplification attack based on the compromise of one or more SIP proxies. We show how to address this threat with a protocol change and formally analyze the effectiveness of the new protocol against amplification attacks.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ravinder Shankesi
    • 1
  • Musab AlTurki
    • 1
  • Ralf Sasse
    • 1
  • Carl A. Gunter
    • 1
  • José Meseguer
    • 1
  1. 1.University of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaignUrbanaUSA

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