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Secure Pseudonymous Channels

  • Sebastian Mödersheim
  • Luca Viganò
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5789)

Abstract

Channels are an abstraction of the many concrete techniques to enforce particular properties of message transmissions such as encryption. We consider here three basic kinds of channels—authentic, confidential, and secure—where agents may be identified by pseudonyms rather than by their real names. We define the meaning of channels as assumptions, i.e. when a protocol relies on channels with particular properties for the transmission of some of its messages. We also define the meaning of channels as goals, i.e. when a protocol aims at establishing a particular kind of channel. This gives rise to an interesting question: given that we have verified that a protocol P 2 provides its goals under the assumption of a particular kind of channel, can we then replace the assumed channel with an arbitrary protocol P 1 that provides such a channel? In general, the answer is negative, while we prove that under certain restrictions such a compositionality result is possible.

Keywords

Security Protocol Secure Channel Attack State Honest Agent Insecure Channel 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sebastian Mödersheim
    • 1
  • Luca Viganò
    • 2
  1. 1.IBM Zurich Research LaboratorySwitzerland
  2. 2.Dep. of Computer ScienceUniversity of VeronaItaly

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