A Design of Secure Preferential E-Voting

  • Kun Peng
  • Feng Bao
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5767)

Abstract

A secure preferential e-voting scheme is designed in this paper. It is a homomorphic e-voting scheme. It is illustrated that although mix-based voting is a very simple solution to preferential e-voting it is vulnerable to a coercion attack. The coercion attack especially attacks preferential e-voting scheme only outputs the election result and does not reveal any vote, so is invulnerable to the attack. Homomorphism of the employed encryption algorithm is exploited not only to count the votes without revealing them but also to adjust the votes when a new round of counting is needed. Moreover, it achieves all the security properties usually desired in e-voting.

Keywords

preferential e-voting coercion attack security 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kun Peng
    • 1
  • Feng Bao
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute for Infocomm ResearchSingapore

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