Minimum Disclosure Counting for the Alternative Vote

  • Roland Wen
  • Richard Buckland
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5767)


Although there is a substantial body of work on preventing bribery and coercion of voters in cryptographic election schemes for plurality electoral systems, there are few attempts to construct such schemes for preferential electoral systems. The problem is preferential systems are prone to bribery and coercion via subtle signature attacks during the counting. We introduce a minimum disclosure counting scheme for the alternative vote preferential system. Minimum disclosure provides protection from signature attacks by revealing only the winning candidate.


Preferential voting alternative vote instant runoff voting online elections counting schemes 


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© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Roland Wen
    • 1
  • Richard Buckland
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Computer Science and EngineeringThe University of New South WalesSydneyAustralia

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