VeryVote: A Voter Verifiable Code Voting System

  • Rui Joaquim
  • Carlos Ribeiro
  • Paulo Ferreira
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5767)


Code voting is a technique used to address the secure platform problem of remote voting. A code voting system consists in secretly sending, e.g. by mail, code sheets to voters that map their choices to entry codes in their ballot. While voting, the voter uses the code sheet to know what code to enter in order to vote for a particular candidate. In effect, the voter does the vote encryption and, since no malicious software on the PC has access to the code sheet it is not able to change the voter’s intention. However, without compromising the voter’s privacy, the vote codes are not enough to prove that the vote is recorded and counted as cast by the election server.

We present a voter verifiable code voting solution which, without revealing the voter’s vote, allows the voter to verify, at the end of the election, that her vote was cast and counted as intended by just performing the match of a few small strings. Moreover, w.r.t. a general code voting system, our solution comes with only a minor change in the voting interaction.


Code voting Internet voting election integrity 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Rui Joaquim
    • 1
  • Carlos Ribeiro
    • 2
  • Paulo Ferreira
    • 2
  1. 1.ISELPolytechnic Institute of LisbonLisboaPortugal
  2. 2.INESC-IDIntituto Superior TécnicoLisboaPortugal

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