Developing a Legal Framework for Remote Electronic Voting

  • Axel Schmidt
  • Dennis Heinson
  • Lucie Langer
  • Zoi Opitz-Talidou
  • Philipp Richter
  • Melanie Volkamer
  • Johannes Buchmann
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5767)


This paper describes how to legally regulate remote electronic elections. Electronic voting systems have to respect the constitutional election principles. For technological solutions, this translates into security requirements that have to be fulfilled by the operational environment in which the voting takes place. Therefore [26] introduced the concept of providing the technical and organizational implementation of a remote electronic election by a qualified trustworthy third party. This paper adds legal regulation to support this concept. The legal framework addresses the secure operation of remote electronic voting services as well as their accreditation and supervision by an official authority.


E-Voting Voting Service Provider Legal regulation Trust concept 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Axel Schmidt
    • 1
  • Dennis Heinson
    • 1
  • Lucie Langer
    • 1
  • Zoi Opitz-Talidou
    • 1
  • Philipp Richter
    • 1
  • Melanie Volkamer
    • 1
  • Johannes Buchmann
    • 1
  1. 1.Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt (CASED) Universität KasselTechnische Universität DarmstadtGermany

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