Improving and Simplifying a Variant of Prêt à Voter

  • Ralf Küsters
  • Tomasz Truderung
  • Andreas Vogt
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5767)


Recently, Xia et al. proposed a variant of Prêt à Voter which enjoys several attractive properties. Their protocol is among the few verifiable and receipt-free paper-based voting protocols resistant against randomization attacks. Trust is distributed among several authorities and the voter interface is relatively simple. Also, approval and ranked elections are supported.

In this paper, we improve and simplify the protocol by Xia et al. Among others, we propose a simpler way of producing ballots, which only involves the encryption and re-encryption of candidate names; homomorphic encryption and proxy re-encryption are not needed. Also, no machine involved in the production of ballots needs to store a secret key. Moreover, unlike the protocol by Xia et al., in our protocol all authorities can be held accountable in case they misbehave in an observable way.


Serial Number Bulletin Board Polling Place Homomorphic Encryption Counter Strategy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ralf Küsters
    • 1
  • Tomasz Truderung
    • 1
  • Andreas Vogt
    • 1
  1. 1.University of TrierGermany

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