Short Chosen-Prefix Collisions for MD5 and the Creation of a Rogue CA Certificate

  • Marc Stevens
  • Alexander Sotirov
  • Jacob Appelbaum
  • Arjen Lenstra
  • David Molnar
  • Dag Arne Osvik
  • Benne de Weger
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5677)

Abstract

We present a refined chosen-prefix collision construction for MD5 that allowed creation of a rogue Certification Authority (CA) certificate, based on a collision with a regular end-user website certificate provided by a commercial CA. Compared to the previous construction from Eurocrypt 2007, this paper describes a more flexible family of differential paths and a new variable birthdaying search space. Combined with a time-memory trade-off, these improvements lead to just three pairs of near-collision blocks to generate the collision, enabling construction of RSA moduli that are sufficiently short to be accepted by current CAs. The entire construction is fast enough to allow for adequate prediction of certificate serial number and validity period: it can be made to require about 249 MD5 compression function calls. Finally, we improve the complexity of identical-prefix collisions for MD5 to about 216 MD5 compression function calls and use it to derive a practical single-block chosen-prefix collision construction of which an example is given.

Keywords

MD5 collision attack certificate PlayStation 3 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marc Stevens
    • 1
  • Alexander Sotirov
    • 1
  • Jacob Appelbaum
    • 1
  • Arjen Lenstra
    • 2
    • 3
  • David Molnar
    • 4
  • Dag Arne Osvik
    • 2
  • Benne de Weger
    • 5
  1. 1.CWIAmsterdamThe Netherlands
  2. 2.EPFL IC LACALLausanneSwitzerland
  3. 3.Alcatel-Lucent Bell LaboratoriesUSA
  4. 4.University of California at BerkeleyUSA
  5. 5.EiPSITU EindhovenThe Netherlands

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