Fairness in Cooperating Multi-agent Systems – Using Profit Sharing as an Example
Distributing profit in a coalition of multiple cooperating agents  is an important issue in both multi-agent and economics society. Proposed in 1953, Shapley value scheme with its elegant axiomatic derivation is essential to solution concepts for profit sharing. However, Shapley value scheme did not cover fairness issues. A new scheme of profit sharing with fairness awareness is proposed in this work. Axioms considering both fairness and efficiency issues are included in the new scheme. An algorithm is constructed for calculation of profit sharing under this new scheme. The existence of a solution existence and other properties of this algorithm are discussed.
KeywordsMarginal Contribution Level Index Profit Sharing Total Reward Partial Order Relation
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