Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol in One-Round

  • Xing-Lan Zhang
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5574)

Abstract

The Key-exchange protocol is one of the most basic and widely used cryptographic protocols in internet for secure communication. In a two-party setting, cryptographic protocol design has often ignored the possibility of simultaneous message transmission by each of the two parties. Most protocols for two-party have been designed assuming that parties alternate sending their messages. We present two provably-secure protocols for two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) which require not only a single round, but more efficient message transmission (from a computational perspective). The protocol provides Implicit Authentication, key independence and forward secrecy, and is analyzed in the standard model. The protocols are the first provably-secure one-round protocol for authenticated 2-party key exchange in the standard model that the message lengths are equal to the basic protocol.

Keywords

Authenticated key exchange Forward secrecy Round complexity Diffie-Hellman key exchange 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Xing-Lan Zhang
    • 1
  1. 1.College of Computer Science and TechnologyBeijing University of TechnologyBeijingChina

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