Hyperloops Do Not Threaten the Notion of an Effective Procedure
This paper develops my (forthcoming) criticisms of the philosophical significance of a certain sort of infinitary computational process, a hyperloop. I start by considering whether hyperloops suggest that “effectively computable” is vague (in some sense). I then consider and criticise two arguments by Hogarth, who maintains that hyperloops undermine the very idea of effective computability. I conclude that hyperloops, on their own, cannot threaten the notion of an effective procedure.
KeywordsTuring Machine Physical Realisation Physical Machine Formal Question Arabic Numeral
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