Performance of Auctions and Sealed Bids

  • Erol Gelenbe
  • László Györfi
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-02924-0_3

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5652)
Cite this paper as:
Gelenbe E., Györfi L. (2009) Performance of Auctions and Sealed Bids. In: Bradley J.T. (eds) Computer Performance Engineering. EPEW 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5652. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg


We develop models of automated E-commerce techniques, which predict the economic outcomes of these decision mechanisms, including the price attained by a good and the resulting income per unit time, as a function of the rate at which bidders provide the bids and of the time taken by the seller to decide whether to accept a bid. This paper extends previous work in two main directions. Since automated E-commerce mechanisms are typically implemented in software residing on the Internet, this paper shows how network quality of service will impact the economic outcome of automated auctions. We also analyse sealed bids which can also be automated, but which differ significantly from auctions in the manner in which information is shared between the bidders and the the party that decides the outcome. The approach that we propose opens novel avenues of research that bring together traditional computer and system performance analysis and the economic analysis of Internet based trading methods.


Auctions Sealed Bids Networked Economics Economic Performance Quality of Service 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Erol Gelenbe
    • 1
  • László Györfi
    • 2
  1. 1.Intelligent Systems and Networks Group Department of Electrical and Electronic EngineeringImperial CollegeLondon
  2. 2.Dept. Computer Science & Information TheoryTechnical University of BudapestBudapestHungary

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