On the Performances of Nash Equilibria in Isolation Games
We study the performances of Nash equilibria in isolation games, a class of competitive location games recently introduced in . For all the cases in which the existence of Nash equilibria has been shown, we give tight or asymptotically tight bounds on the prices of anarchy and stability under the two classical social functions mostly investigated in the scientific literature, namely, the minimum utility per player and the sum of the players’ utilities. Moreover, we prove that the convergence to Nash equilibria is not guaranteed in some of the not yet analyzed cases.
KeywordsNash Equilibrium Weight Vector Social Function Social Optimum Tight Bound
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