Abstract
Knowledge sharing in enterprises is propitious to the employees’ knowledge richness and growth. The purpose of this paper is to apply game models to analyze knowledge sharing. First, we conclude that knowledge sharing is often trapped in “prisoner’s dilemma”. Then we find that “Ratchet Effects” exists and weaken the validity of incentive mechanisms. At last, we conclude that a more objective evaluation standard and long-term incentive contract would help to eliminate “Ratchet Effects”.
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Wang, Y., Zhang, L., Zheng, X., Shi, Y. (2009). Research on Ratchet Effects in Enterprises’ Knowledge Sharing Based on Game Models. In: Shi, Y., Wang, S., Peng, Y., Li, J., Zeng, Y. (eds) Cutting-Edge Research Topics on Multiple Criteria Decision Making. MCDM 2009. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 35. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02298-2_30
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02298-2_30
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-02297-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-02298-2
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