Attacking ECDSA-Enabled RFID Devices

  • Michael Hutter
  • Marcel Medwed
  • Daniel Hein
  • Johannes Wolkerstorfer
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5536)

Abstract

The elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) is used in many devices to provide authentication. In the last few years, more and more ECDSA implementations have been proposed that allow the integration into resource-constrained devices like RFID tags. Their resistance against power-analysis attacks has not been scrutinized so far. In this article, we provide first results of power-analysis attacks on an RFID device that implements ECDSA. To this end, we designed and implemented a passive RFID-tag prototype. The core element of the prototype is a low-power ECDSA implementation realized on 180 nm CMOS technology. We performed power and electromagnetic attacks on that platform and describe an attack that successfully reveals the private-key during signature generation. Our experiments confirm that ECDSA-enabled RFID tags are susceptible to these attacks. Hence, it is important that they implement countermeasures which prevent the forging of digital signatures.

Keywords

Radio-Frequency Identification RFID Side-Channel Analysis ECDSA Elliptic Curve Cryptography Implementation Security 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael Hutter
    • 1
  • Marcel Medwed
    • 1
  • Daniel Hein
    • 1
  • Johannes Wolkerstorfer
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK)Graz University of TechnologyGrazAustria

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