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Belief-Based Stability in Non-transferable Utility Coalition Formation

  • Chi-Kong Chan
  • Ho-Fung Leung
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5044)

Abstract

Coalition stability is an important concept in coalition formation. One common assumption in many stability criteria in non-transferable utility games is that the preference of each agent is publicly known so that a coalition is said to be stable if there is no objections by any sub-group of agents according to the publicly known preferences. However, in many applications including some software agent applications, this assumption is not true. Instead, agents are modeled as individuals with private belief and decisions are made according to those beliefs instead of common knowledge. Such belief based architectures have impacts on the coalition’s stability which is not reflected in the current stability criteria. In this paper, we extend the classic stability concept of the core by proposing a new belief based stability criterion which we labeled the belief-based core.

Keywords

Coalition Formation Stability Non-transferable Utility Games 

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References

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    Kraus, S., Shehory, O., Taase, G.: The advantages of compromising in coalition formation with incomplete information. In: Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, pp. 588–595 (2004)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Chi-Kong Chan
    • 1
  • Ho-Fung Leung
    • 1
  1. 1.The Chinese University of Hong Kong, ShatinHong Kong

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