A Reputation-Based Game for Tasks Allocation

  • Hamdi Yahyaoui
Part of the Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing book series (LNBIP, volume 24)


We present in this paper a distributed game theoretical model for tasks allocation. During the game, each agent submits a cost for achieving a specific task. Each agent, that is offering a specific task, computes the so-called reputation-based cost, which is the product between the submitted cost and the inverse of the reputation value of the bidding agent. The game winner is the agent which has the minimal reputation-based cost. We show how the use of reputation allows a better allocation of tasks with respect to a conventional allocation where there is no consideration of the reputation as a criteria for allocating tasks.


Game Reputation VCG Tasks Allocation 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hamdi Yahyaoui
    • 1
  1. 1.Information and Computer Science DepartmentKing Fahd University of Petroleum and MineralsDhahranSaudi Arabia

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