Reconstruction Failures: Questioning Level Design

  • Camille Roth
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5466)

Abstract

In front of unsuccessful models and simulations, we suggest that reductionist and emergentist attitudes may make it harder to detect ill-conceived modeling ontology and subsequent epistemological dead-ends. We argue that some high-level phenomena just cannot be explained and reconstructed from unsufficiently informative lower levels. This eventually requires a fundamental viewpoint change in not only low-level dynamics but also in the design of low-level objects themselves, considering distinct levels of description as just distinct observations on a single process.

Keywords

Modeling Methodology Reconstruction Emergence Downward Causation Complex Systems 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Camille Roth
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Centre d’Analyse et de Mathématique Sociales CNRS/EHESSParisFrance
  2. 2.CREA Ecole Polytechnique/CNRS 1ParisFrance

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