On the Security Loss in Cryptographic Reductions

  • Chi-Jen Lu
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-01001-9_4

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5479)
Cite this paper as:
Lu CJ. (2009) On the Security Loss in Cryptographic Reductions. In: Joux A. (eds) Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2009. EUROCRYPT 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5479. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg


Almost all the important cryptographic protocols we have today base their security on unproven assumptions, which all imply NP\(\ne\)P, and thus having unconditional proofs of their security seems far beyond our reach. One research effort then is to identify more basic primitives and prove the security of these protocols by reductions to the security of these primitives. However, in doing so, one often observes some security loss in the form that the security of the protocols is measured against weaker adversaries, e.g., adversaries with a smaller running time. Is such a security loss avoidable? We study two of the most basic cryptographic reductions: hardness amplification of one-way functions and constructing pseudorandom generators from one-way functions. We show that when they are done in a certain black-box way, such a security loss is in fact unavoidable.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Chi-Jen Lu
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute of Information ScienceAcademia SinicaTaipeiTaiwan

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