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Communication-Efficient Private Protocols for Longest Common Subsequence

  • Matthew Franklin
  • Mark Gondree
  • Payman Mohassel
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5473)

Abstract

We design communication efficient two-party and multi-party protocols for the longest common subsequence (LCS) and related problems. Our protocols achieve privacy with respect to passive adversaries, under reasonable cryptographic assumptions. We benefit from the somewhat surprising interplay of an efficient block-retrieval PIR (Gentry-Ramzan, ICALP 2005) with the classic “four Russians” algorithmic design. This result is the first improvement to the communication complexity for this application over generic results (such as Yao’s garbled circuit protocol) and, as such, is interesting as a contribution to the theory of communication efficiency for secure two-party and multiparty applications.

Keywords

Communication Complexity Homomorphic Encryption Oblivious Transfer Longe Common Subsequence Private Diff 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Matthew Franklin
    • 1
  • Mark Gondree
    • 1
  • Payman Mohassel
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of CaliforniaDavisUSA

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