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The Swiss-Knife RFID Distance Bounding Protocol

  • Chong Hee Kim
  • Gildas Avoine
  • François Koeune
  • François-Xavier Standaert
  • Olivier Pereira
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5461)

Abstract

Relay attacks are one of the most challenging threats RFID will have to face in the close future. They consist in making the verifier believe that the prover is in its close vicinity by surreptitiously forwarding the signal between the verifier and an out-of-field prover. Distance bounding protocols represent a promising way to thwart relay attacks, by measuring the round trip time of short authenticated messages. Several such protocols have been designed during the last years but none of them combine all the features one may expect in a RFID system.

We introduce in this paper the first solution that compounds in a single protocol all these desirable features. We prove, with respect to the previous protocols, that our proposal is the best one in terms of security, privacy, tag computational overhead, and fault tolerance. We also point out a weakness in Tu and Piramuthu’s protocol, which was considered up to now as one of the most efficient distance bounding protocol.

Keywords

Success Probability Terrorist Attack Round Trip Time Authentication Protocol Exchange Phase 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Chong Hee Kim
    • 1
  • Gildas Avoine
    • 1
  • François Koeune
    • 1
  • François-Xavier Standaert
    • 1
  • Olivier Pereira
    • 1
  1. 1.Université catholique de LouvainLouvain-la-NeuveBelgium

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