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Cryptographic Protocol Composition via the Authentication Tests

  • Joshua D. Guttman
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5504)

Abstract

Although cryptographic protocols are typically analyzed in isolation, they are used in combinations. If a protocol Π 1, when analyzed alone, was shown to meet some security goals, will it still meet those goals when executed together with a second protocol Π 2? Not necessarily: for every Π 1, some Π 2s undermine its goals. We use the strand space “authentication test” principles to suggest a criterion to ensure a Π 2 preserves Π 1’s goals; this criterion strengthens previous proposals.

Security goals for Π 1 are expressed in a language \(\mathcal{L}\)(Π 1) in classical logic. Strand spaces provide the models for \(\mathcal{L}\)(Π 1). Certain homomorphisms among models for \(\mathcal{L}\)(Π) preserve the truth of the security goals. This gives a way to extract—from a counterexample to a goal that uses both protocols—a counterexample using only the first protocol. This model-theoretic technique, using homomorphisms among models to prove results about a syntactically defined set of formulas, appears to be novel for protocol analysis.

Keywords

Atomic Formula Trusted Platform Module Security Goal Transmission Node Secondary Node 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Joshua D. Guttman
    • 1
  1. 1.The MITRE CorporationUSA

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