Purely Rational Secret Sharing (Extended Abstract)
Rational secret sharing is a problem at the intersection of cryptography and game theory. In essence, a dealer wishes to engineer a communication game that, when rationally played, guarantees that each of the players learns the dealer’s secret. Yet, all solutions proposed so far did not rely solely on the players’ rationality, but also on their beliefs, and were also quite inefficient.
After providing a more complete definition of the problem, we exhibit a very efficient and purely rational solution to it with a verifiable trusted channel.
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