Fault Tolerance in Distributed Mechanism Design

  • Ronen Gradwohl
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5385)


We argue that in distributed mechanism design frameworks it is important to consider not only rational manipulation by players, but also malicious, faulty behavior. To this end, we show that in some instances it is possible to take a centralized mechanism and implement it in a distributed setting in a fault tolerant manner. More specifically, we examine two distinct models of distributed mechanism design – a Nash implementation with the planner as a node on the network, and an ex post Nash implementation with the planner only acting as a “bank”. For each model we show that the implementation can be made resilient to faults.


Nash Equilibrium Fault Tolerance Byzantine Agreement Faulty Behavior Nash Implementation 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ronen Gradwohl
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer Science and Applied MathematicsThe Weizmann Institute of ScienceRehovotIsrael

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