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Online Market Coordination

  • Masabumi Furuhata
  • Dongmo Zhang
  • Laurent Perrussel
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5357)

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to deal with the problem of coordination for online markets where a seller registers to an online market to sell an item. The seller and the owner of the market then form an alliance to generate revenue through online sales. However, the efficiency and stability of the alliance highly relies on the contract that specifies the way to split the revenue and costs over the alliane members. We consider some typical contracts and examine their influences on the behavior of the alliance. We introduce the key concept of alliance coordinattion which characterizes the efficiency and stability of an online market.

Keywords

Supply Chain Nash Equilibrium Coalition Game Supply Chain Coordination Advertisement Effect 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Masabumi Furuhata
    • 1
    • 2
  • Dongmo Zhang
    • 1
  • Laurent Perrussel
    • 2
  1. 1.Intelligent Systems LaboratoryUniversity of Western SydneyAustralia
  2. 2.IRIT-Université de ToulouseFrance

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