Social Viewpoints for Arguing about Coalitions

  • Guido Boella
  • Leendert van der Torre
  • Serena Villata
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5357)


Frameworks for arguing about coalitions are based on non-monotonic logic and are therefore formal and abstract, whereas social theories about agent coalitions typically are based on conceptual modeling languages and therefore semi-formal and detailed. In this paper we bridge the gap between these two research areas such that social viewpoints can be used to argue about coalitions. We formally define three social viewpoints with abstraction and refinement relations among them, and we adapt an existing coalition argumentation theory to reason about the coalitions defined in the most abstract social viewpoint.


Multiagent System Coalition Formation Coalition Structure Argumentation Theory Argumentation Framework 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Guido Boella
    • 1
  • Leendert van der Torre
    • 2
  • Serena Villata
    • 1
  1. 1.Dipartimento di InformaticaUniversity of TurinItaly
  2. 2.Computer Science and CommunicationUniversity of LuxembourgLuxembourg

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